

The future of the Euro Area and Its Enlargement

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Outline

- EMU: lessons from the crisis
- When should Romania join EMU?

Lessons from the crisis: What was wrong with EMU 1.0?

- Impact of EMU on financial integration underestimated & consequences for financial stability ignored:
EMU 1.0 was liable to financial crises
- Nature of EMU sovereign debt ignored:
EMU 1.0 was liable to sovereign debt crises
- Loss of the ER instrument not compensated:
EMU 1.0 was liable to adjustment problems


The EMU 1.0 system failed

- Prior to the crisis, surveillance was inadequate
 - It did not understand well the nature of the risks, including for BOP
 - Fiscal surveillance: SGP focus on deficit rather than debt sustainability
 - No EZ financial surveillance, inadequate national surveillance
- Prior to the crisis, adjustment mechanisms were inadequate
 - The REER channel did not work well: divergences in competitiveness were not corrected automatically or otherwise
- When the crisis occurred, the system lacked adequate tools to respond

The system allowed huge imbalances

- Very large current deficits
- Huge build up of private and public debts, and external debts
- Loss of competitiveness
- The music stopped when the financial crisis started


Effect of EMU on external imbalances: Current account



Correlation (GIIPS,DM)
1960-1998: +0.28

Correlation (GIIPS,DM)
1999-2012: -0.73

Same for Germany and Greece



Averages 1960-1998

DE = 0.9


GR = -0.9

Averages 1999-2012

DE = 3.7

GR = -12.1

Risk of sudden stop not understood before Lehmann



How can EMU avoid or deal with financial crises?

- EMU needs a common mechanism for supervision, resolution and deposit insurance guarantee for banks
- EMU 2.0 provides a partial answer
- EMU 3.0 needs to
 - Improve SRM, create a common deposit insurance guarantee scheme
 - Eventually merge SSM, SRM and DIGM into one institution
 - Reduce bank dependence: Capital Markets Union

How can EMU avoid or deal with sovereign debt crises?

- EMU needs common mechanisms to lower national sovereign debt and to reduce the exposure of banks to sovereign debt
- EMU 2.0 provides a partial answer
- EMU 3.0 needs to
 - Better enforce fiscal rules to reduce debt levels
 - Envisage Eurobonds/Eurobills
 - Replace ESM by EMF and include a European SDRM
 - Limit the exposure of banks to sovereign debt

How can EMU avoid or deal with adjustment problems?

- EMU needs national and common mechanisms to reduce or handle adjustment problems
- EMU 2.0 provides a partial answer
- EMU 3.0 needs to
 - Improve market mechanisms at national and EU levels
 - Improve fiscal mechanisms at national and EU/EA levels
 - Reduce **heterogeneity** among MS

When should Romania join EMU?

- “The euro is meant to be the single currency of the EU as a whole...Member States that want to join the euro must be able to do so.” (JC Juncker)
- When should Romania adopt the euro?
- Should Romania join the BU before adopting the euro?

The EU 2016 Convergence Report: Results for Romania


- Legal compatibility? NO
- Maastricht convergence criteria fulfilment?
 - Price stability: YES (but NOT in 2018 according to COM)
 - Public finances: YES (but NOT in 2017 & 18 according to COM)
 - LT interest rate: YES
 - Exchange rate (ERM2): NO
- Other relevant factors
 - Macro (MIP): OK
 - Micro (markets, business environment): still problematic

Nominal vs. real convergence

- The nominal convergence criteria are basically meant to ensure that countries can live with price stability
- They don't ensure against macroeconomic imbalances (the MIP was introduced for that, during the crisis)
- Insufficient real convergence is a better indicator of the risk of macroeconomic imbalance

Convergence in the 11 CEECs that joined the EU in/after 2004

(GDP per capita at PPP, EU15 = 100)



Simple average for the 11 countries

40

41

15

49

64

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
Rule of thumb

- A good rule of thumb should be that countries with relatively low GDP per capita
 - Should not abandon the ER instrument
 - If they do, they should be especially mindful of the risk of macroeconomic imbalances
 - And have very flexible product and labour markets
- With the second lowest GDP per capita country in the EU, Romania should be especially mindful
- Yet it is true that some CEECs have successfully adopted the euro when they had low pc GDP (Slovakia)
- No simple correlation between ER regime and growth


Exchange rate regimes, 1996-2009 and 2017

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2017
Bulgaria	Floating	Currency board, DM	Currency board, EUR												Currency board
Czech Rep.	Band 65% DM, 3% USD +/- 7.5%	Floating													Floating
Estonia	Currency board to DM					Currency board to EUR		ERM-II, Currency board						Euro	
Hungary	Crawling band, +/- 2.25%, 30% USD &: 70% ECU	70% DM	70% EUR	Crawling band, EUR +/- 2.25%	EUR band +/- 15%						Floating	Floating			
Latvia	Peg to SDR, +/- 1%									Peg to €	ERM-II +/- 1%				Euro
Lithuania	Currency board to USD						Currency board to EUR		ERM-II, Currency board						Euro
Poland	Crawling band 45% USD, 35% DM, 10% GBP, 5% FFR, 5% CHF +/- 7%			55% EUR, 45% USD +/- 12.5% +/- 10%		Floating									Floating
Romania	Floating														Floating
Slovakia	60% DM, 40% USD band +/- 3% +/- 5%		+7%		Floating						ERM-II +/- 15%, de facto float with revaluations		Euro	Euro	
Slovenia	Managed floating, de facto peg or crawling peg to DM/Euro								ERM-II narrow band		Euro				Euro
Croatia	Managed floating			Managed floating, de facto peg to EUR											Managed peg

Exchange rates: national currencies against the euro 2008=100



GDP growth rates, 2004-2016: All CEECs



AAGR

SK	4.01	EE	2.70
PL	3.87	CZ	2.64
RO	3.47	SL	1.73
LT	3.32	HU	1.54
BG	3.29	HR	0.90
LV	3.00		

Adopting the euro: Economic pros and cons

- Joining EMU 2.0 is better than EMU 1.0, but EMU 3.0 would even be better though the waiting may be long
- Pros
 - Anchoring the fiscal framework
 - Less transaction costs => trade, investment
 - More financial integration
 - Financial stability: ECB access, banking union
 - ESM access
- Cons
 - Risk of macroeconomic imbalances during convergence process
 - Loss of ER instrument for stabilization
 - ESM cost

Joining the banking union: Economic pros and cons

- Pros

- Financial stability, though without ECB access
 - Improved home-host coordination of supervision
 - Improved resolution of cross-border institutions

- Cons

- ?

Conclusion

- Only one CEEC with floating rates has adopted the euro
- Will Romania be the next one? When?
- Romania was on-track to meet Maastricht criteria
- But the crisis has reminded us that real convergence matters at least as much as nominal convergence
- EMU 2.0 is a significant improvement over EMU 1.0
- Still, Romania should take its time. In the meantime it should consider joining the banking union

Thank you!